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INTRODUCTION
In June of 1980, the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, by a 5 to 4
majority, that living organisms could be patented.1 Although the Court suggested that the holding
was required bythe text of the federal patent subject matter statute, in reality neither statutory
text nor legal precedent directly addressed the issue. In fact, given the pioneering nature of the
patent application at issue, a holding against patentability in the case would have been both
easier to justify and significantly less controversial than the Court’s actual holding. Far from
simply applying clear law to facts, the Court in Chakrabarty adopted an aggressive method of
interpretation in order to update a statute in conformity with changing technology. Although
several Congressional debates about Chakrabarty have occurred in the nearly quarter-century
since the decision, Chakrabarty was never overridden by Congress.
In this article, I consider the Chakrabarty decision and Congress’ response to it in light of
several contemporary views on statutory interpretation. I conclude that in science and
technology-related cases in which delay could significantly hamper the advancement of the field,
the Supreme Court should interpret federal statutes dynamically in response to a changing social
context, but should also attempt to conform its interpretations to legislative preferences in order
to avoid a legislative override.
This approach has been proposed and discussed in several articles by Professor William
Eskridge. Eskridge has endorsed a theory of “dynamic statutory interpretation,” but has also
posited that the Supreme Court often attempts to avoid legislative override by attempting to
mirror legislative preferences.2 Eskridge suggests that such behavior by the Court is in many
cases normatively desirable.3 Several writers have produced important alternatives to Eskridge’s
model. Professor John Manning, an adherent of the textualist approach, arguesthat judges sh ould
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focus only on the plain text of a statute, ignoring contemporary legislative preferences as well as
any information about the enacting legislature’s intent that might be gleaned from legislative
history.4 Professor Einer Elhauge, by contrast, endorses dynamic statutoryinterpretation, but in a
more limited form than Eskridge. Elhauge would permit such interpretation only when the Court
is confident that an interpretive preference could be enacted by the current legislature, not simply
when the legislature would not override the interpretation, as Eskridge suggests.5
Putting aside questions as to how the Court actually behaves, I argue thatat least in the
narrow realm of technological development, Eskridge’s approach is the superior one. I suggest
that in cases such as Chakrabarty, in which the statutory text is itself ambiguous and the enacting
legislature could not have conceived of the contemporary context, Manning’s theory provides
insufficient guidance. I also argue that for the same class of cases, Elhauge’s approach
excessively restricts the Court’s ability to advance the law by acting more quickly than Congress,
which might otherwise take years to address an issue due to political wrangling or procedural
roadblocks. This point is particularly significant in the patent field, where the rapid pace of
technological and scientific change requires frequent statutory changes.
The strength of the approach I outline depends, however, on the responsiveness of
Congress; if Congress is unable to override Supreme Court statutory interpretations of which it
disapproves, then my approach would permit an unelected Court to enact its personal policy
preferences into law. Analysis of this issue is problematic due to the complexity of the legislative
process, which makes it difficult to interpret both legislative action, such as the initiation of
hearings or a floor discussion, and legislative inaction, which might imply lack of interest in an
issue, but might also stem from interest group pressure or even simple inertia. Based on an
analysis of the congressional response to Chakrabarty and on the research of Professor Eskridge,
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this article concludes, however, that in the patent law context, the approach described above is
feasible and appropriate, providing the proper balance between significant interests in
technological progress and important concerns about countermajoritarianism.
In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court’s holding in Chakrabarty was the
correct one. Part I of this article describes the Chakrabarty decision and the relevant legal
precedent, demonstrating that despite the conservative tone of the opinion, the Court’s holding
was a clear assertion of authority to use expansive statutory interpretation in order to update
statutes in light of changing social circumstances. Part II details the slight Congressional
response immediately following the decision and the more significant response following the
Board of Patent Appeals’ broad interpretation of the decision in 1987. Part III explains Professor
Eskridge’s theories of statutory interpretation and considers two important alternatives to his
approach. It also describes his findings, in light of questions posed in this article, as to Congress’
ability to respond to Supreme Court holdings. The article concludes that due to the importance of
speed in many cases related to scientific advancement, the Supreme Court should be free to
interpret statutes dynamically in such cases, while consciously attempting to avoid legislative
override.
PART I: THE COURT DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH
1.1: The Supreme Court Decision
In 1972, a microbiologist working at General Electric (GE) named Ananda Chakrabarty
filed a patent application based on his development of a bacterium capable of breaking down
certain components of crude oil, an innovation that he suggested could be useful in cleaning up
oil spills.6 Chakrabarty had developed the bacterium by transferring four plasmids (small circular
DNA molecules), each with the ability to break down particular components of oil, into a
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Pseudomonas bacterium, which prior to the transfer was incapable of degrading oil.7 He claimed
patent rights on both the method of producing the bacterium and on the bacterium itself.8
The Supreme Court approved both patent rights. It characterized the issue in the case as a
“narrow one of statutory interpretation,”9 requiring the Court to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
federal statute that defines patentable subject matter. That statute provides:
Whoever invests or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.
The Court focused on whether Chakrabarty’s bacterium constituted “manufacture” or
“composition of matter” within the meaning of the statute, and noted that “[i]n choosing such
expansive terms…modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope.”10 The Court considered whether Chakrabarty’s
organism failed the “product of nature” test, a well-established doctrine that prohibited the
patenting of newly discovered but unaltered natural products. In American Fruit Growers v.
Brogdex in1931, the Supreme Court had reinforced this doctrine, holding that an orange, the rind
of which had been treated with borax, could not be patented, because “addition of borax to the
rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which possesses a
new or distinctive form, quality or property.”11 The Chakrabarty Court rejected the view that
Charkabarty’s organism was simply a product of nature, however, stating that his claim was “not
to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter – a product of human ingenuity….”12
The government argued that Congress had not intended living things to be included
within the scope of §101. It claimed that the enactment of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which
provided for patent protection for certain asexually reproduced plants, and the enactment of the
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1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, which provided the same protection for certain sexually
reproduced plants but specifically excluded bacteria, clearly indicated that Congress believed
§ 101 not to encompass living things – if § 101 had encompassed living things, the government
argued, neither the 1930 nor the 1970 Act would have been necessary.13
The Court dismissed this argument. It stated that plants were thought by Congress to fall
outside of the scope of §101 not because they were alive, but rather because they were
considered “products of nature,” which were non-patentable, and because they were considered
not amenable to the “written description” requirement of patent law under 35 U.S.C. § 112.14
The first Patent Act addressed these concerns, the Court said, and the second Act was simply
passed to include sexually reproducing plants, whose utility for identical reproduction was not
recognized in 1930, but had become clear by 1970.15
The Court’s opinion in Chakrabarty thus appears to be a straightforward application of
statutory interpretation techniques, seemingly uncontroversial. The more radical character of the
Court’s decision in Chakrabarty begins to emerge, however, through a consideration of the
central disagreement between the majority and the dissent in the case.
This disagreement centered on the government’s claim that living things should not be
considered patentable subject matter unless Congress indicated explicitly that such patent
protection was authorized. Congress, the government argued in its brief, “is best able to resolve
the complex social, economic, and scientific questions frequently involved in [decisions
extending the scope of patent law], and, if an extension is to be made, to tailor the statute to
achieve precisely the desired ends.”16 This claim appeared to be on strong ground, particularly
because only two years earlier, the Court in Parker v. Flook had stated explicitly that “we must
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proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress,”17 and had quoted from a 1972 opinion in Deepsouth Packing by Justice White:
[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior
cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of
privilege is based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory
language. We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before
approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the
beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts
had previously thought.18
In Chakrabarty, however, the Court was not amenable to such a claim. Although it was
clearly the Congress’s role to define patentable subject matter, the Court stated, it was entirely
within the province of the judiciary to interpret Congress’s intention once in written form, and
there was no ambiguity in §101 as to the patentability of living organisms.19 The fact that the
subject matter provision in § 101 did not explicitly include living organisms was unimportant,
because “[b]road general language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives
require broad terms.”20 Unlike in Flook, the Court was untroubled by the possibility that
Congress had not foreseen a particular extension of patentable subject matter, and declared the
government’s narrow understanding of §101 to be in tension with the very purposes of patent
law: “the inventions most benefiting mankind are those that ‘push back the frontiers of
chemistry, physics, and the like’…. Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101
precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable.”21
The Court portrayed its holding as a restrained one, meant to avoid treading on the
province of Congress. In response to claims in both the government’s brief and an amicus brief
that the patenting of living organisms posed significant ethical, social, and political concerns,22
the Court declared that the judiciary was without power to consider such issues:
The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles. … [But] we are without
competence to entertain these arguments …. The choice we are urged to make is
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a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind
of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and
courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and
interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected
representatives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on us
should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress
and the Executive, and not to the courts.23
In light of its dicta in Flook, statutory language that was far from clear, and the
controversial nature of the issue in the case, the Court’s tone of modest restraint was curious, as
Judge Brennan in dissent was quick to point out. Precisely because of the legislative nature of the
issues involved, the dissent argued, “we must be careful to extend patent protection no further
than Congress has provided.”24 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s construction of the
plant patent acts, arguing that they indicated a congressional understanding that living things
were not patentable, or at least “are signs of legislative attention to the problems of patenting
living organisms” without an “affirmative indication of congressional intent that bacteria be
patentable.”25 Even if there were no indication on the issue from Congress, however, “the courts
should leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into
areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not available,”26 the dissent
argued.
Thus, the dispute between the majority and dissent in Chakrabarty was not simply about
whether § 101 was meant by Congress to include living organisms; more significantly, it
concerned the proper roles of the Court and of Congress in advancing the law. The majority’s
opinion suggested that even if Congress had not intended § 101 to include living organisms, the
statute’s ambiguity allowed the Court to accommodate changing technology by interpreting it
that way, after which Congress could consider the relevant social issues and overturn the court’s
ruling if necessary. In the dissent’s view, however, the ambiguity of the statute precluded an
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expansion of the law; the Court’s proper role was necessarily a conservative one. The dissent felt
that only Congress, in its representative capacity and after careful consideration of the
complicated issues involved, could act to adapt the law to changing times.
Of course, the majority did not explicitly enunciate a progressive vision, instead
portraying its decision as one mandated by the existing law. As described below, however, this
conservative presentation of the decision is belied by the relevant precedent and lower court
opinions in the case. In fact, the Court was basically unfettered in deciding the issue – at the very
least, the precedent was ambiguous, and the Court could easily have taken the more conservative
path of holding for the government, allowing Congress to include living organisms within patent
protection if it chose to do so. Instead, the Court in Chakrabarty positioned itself as an active
player in the advancement of science through the law, pushing the borders of patent law to the
extent that the statutory language would allow, and leaving Congress to override its decision if it
felt that the Court had interpreted the statute incorrectly.
1.2: Legal Precedent and Lower Court Opinions
Before the late 1970s, neither the patent office nor the courts had taken any clear position
as to the patentability of living organisms. As the Patent Commissioner noted in his brief in
Chakrabarty, however, “it was the general understanding … that legislation was needed if patent
protection was to be extended to microorganisms,” and various commentators and organizations,
including the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Section of the American Bar Association,
had favored legislation to expand patent protection to microorganisms, suggesting that such
protection did not already exist.27
While some live matter – such as eggs, yeast, plant seeds, and bacterial spores – had
been patented,28 patent applications on microorganisms were uniformly rejected, and certain
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courts’ dicta hinted that they might be per se unpatentable.29 In most cases that raised the issue of
patentability of living organisms, however, courts generally avoided addressing the issue directly
and instead dismissed the applications on other grounds.30 In 1948 in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., for example, the Supreme Court considered a patent application for a
substance capable of fixing nitrogen in legumes that was made up of six strains of bacteria.31
Previous attempts at combining bacterial strains for this purpose had failed due to the inhibitive
effects of each strain on the others, but the Funk Brothers applicant had developed a particular
combination of bacteria to avoid this problem.32 The Court did not consider the issue of whether
bacteria were unpatentable per se, holding instead that because “[e]ach of the species of rootnodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it
always infected,” the invention was a product of nature and thus unpatentable.33 Similarly, in the
1975 In re Merat decision, the CCPA faced a patent application for a process of producing
“dwarf” hens, which could be mated with “normal” roosters to produce “normal” heavy meat
fowl (using less chicken feed than normally required).34 The application included a patent claim
on the chickens produced by the method themselves.35 The court found the patent specification
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112 unsatisfied in the case, thus avoiding any consideration of the
implications of permitting a patent on a chicken.36
Two cases squarely raising the issue of whether living organisms could be patented made
their way through the federal courts at approximately the same time. In 1974, the Upjohn
Research Laboratory filed an application for a patent on the microorganism Streptomyces
vellosus, developed to produce the antibiotic lincomycin, in the name of Upjohn scientist
Malcolm E. Bergy.37 Patent applications on both the Bergy and Chakrabarty organisms were
rejected by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the rejections were affirmed on appeal
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by the Board of Appeals of the PTO (Board).38 The two cases eventually arrived at the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which at the time was the highest patent court below the
Supreme Court.39
In Chakrabarty’s case, the patent examiner who initially considered the patent application
permitted the process patent but rejected the application for a patent on the bacterium itself,
stating that the patent was disallowed first, as a “product of nature” and second, because living
things are not patentable under § 101.40 On appeal, the Board reversed the examiner on the first
holding, finding that the bacterium in the application was not naturally occurring and thus not a
“product of nature.”41 The Board upheld the second stated ground for decision, however, finding
that Congress did not intend to include living organisms within the scope of § 101.42
The Upjohn microorganism patent application was also rejected by the patent examiner,
in that case on the sole ground that it was unpatentable as a “product of nature.”43 The Board
seemed to disregard the examiner’s rationale for rejection, however, and again based its own
rejection of the application on the fact that the microorganism was living and thus unpatentable
under § 101.44 It stated that it had “extensively researched prior court decisions for guidance” as
to whether living things could be patented, but “other than possibly non-controlling dicta,” could
not find any case on point.45 It went on to find, however, that “only those categories of subject
matter specifically enumerated in the statute are patentable and a living organism does not fall
within the scope of any of those categories listed,” and that allowing bacteria to be patented
might lead to the patenting of much more complicated forms of life.46
The Upjohn patent appeal was the first to reach the CCPA, which reversed in a 3-2
decision.47 The court began by flatly rejecting the suggestion that the microorganism was a
product of nature, finding the evidence “incontrovertible” that the microorganism was not found
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in nature.48 As for the issue of whether living things could be patented, the court labeled it a
question of first impression, and briefly reviewed potentially relevant precedent.49
The court first considered In re Mancy, a 1974 case in which it had addressed the
patentability of a method of producing an antibiotic by aerobically cultivating a strain of
Streptomyces birfurcus.50 In that case, the court overruled a finding of obviousness51 by the
lower court and compared it to a 1973 case, In re Kuehl,52 in which the non-obviousness
requirement had been deemed satisfied.53 In rejecting any significant differences between the
two cases, the Mancy court admitted that in Kuehl,
the novel zeolite used as a catalyst in the claimed hydrocarbon cracking processes
was itself the subject of allowed claims in the application. Here appellants not
only have no allowed claim to the novel strain of Streptomyces used in their
process but would, we presume (without deciding), be unable to obtain such a
claim because the strain, while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of
record, is, as we understand it, a ‘product of nature.’54
This dictum had in the past been interpreted as indicating that living things were not patentable,
since it suggested that the appellants would not have been permitted to claim a patent on the
microorganism at issue. The CCPA rejected this reading, however, stating that “we now make it
explicit that the thought underlying our presumption that Mancy could not have obtained a claim
to the strain of microorganism he had described was simply that it lacked novelty,” and in any
case “our dictum was ill-considered.”55
The CCPA also addressed dictum in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents
Corp., 1931 case from the district court of Delaware.56 In that case, which involved a patent
application for a fermentation process using bacteria, the court stated:
Lastly, the defendant contends that the invention of the Weizmann patent is
unpatentable since it is for the life process of a living organism. Were the patent
for bacteria per se, a different situation would be presented. As before stated, the
patent is not for bacteria per se. It is for a fermentation process employing
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bacteria discovered by Weizmann under conditions set forth in the specification
and claims.57
Again, this statement had been interpreted to indicate that living things were unpatentable,
because the court in Guaranty Trust distinguished between permissible patenting of a process
and impermissible patenting of the living organism itself. The CCPA rejected the relevance of
this dictum out of hand, however, testily declaring it “a trite observation of minimal magnitude
as precedent, dealing with a non-issue on which no opinion was expressed.”58 Finding the
proffered precedent on the unpatentability of living organisms unconvincing, the Court
concluded that “the fact that microorganisms, as distinguished from chemical compounds, are
alive is a distinction without legal significance and that disposes of the board's ground of
rejection and the sole reason for refusal of a patent argued by the solicitor.”59
In Chakrabarty’s appeal to the CCPA, the Court referred back to its reasoning in Bergy
and reversed, in another 3-2 decision.60 In a strongly worded concurrence, Chief Judge Markey
added that § 101 “is not ambiguous. No Congressional intent to limit patents to dead inventions
lurks in the lacuna of the statute, and there is no grave or compelling circumstance requiring us
to find it there.”61
In 1979, the Supreme Court granted the Commissioner of Patent and Trademark’s
petition for certiorari in both Bergy and Chakrabarty, then vacated both judgments and remanded
“for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook.”62 Flook, which had recently been decided,
involved a patent application on a method for updating alarm limits (which are settings for
temperature, pressure, and other variables and signal abnormal conditions) during catalytic
conversion, in which the only new feature compared to previous methods was a particular
mathematical formula.63 The Flook Court held that the method was not patentable because
mathematical formulas may not be patented.64 Beyond the warning, quoted above, that “we must
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proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress,”65 and the related statement from Justice White’s opinion in Deepsouth Packing,66 the
relevance of the Court’s decision in Flook to the facts of Chakrabarty and Bergy remain unclear.
It is thus likely that the Court was referring the CCPA to these cautionary notes that urged a
conservative reading of §101 in vacating and remanding the Chakrabarty and Bergy decisions.
On remand, the CCPA wrote a joint decision for both cases, affirming its previous
rulings.67 The court reviewed the facts and holding of Flook in detail, and despite the implication
of the Supreme Court’s remand, found the case to be irrelevant, concluding, “[t]he only thing we
see in common in these appeals and in Flook is that they all involve § 101.”68 The CCPA
rejected the claim that the Court’s remand was based on Flook’s cautionary language, stating:
We are not faced with a litigant urging upon us a construction of § 101 which is
at odds with established precedent. Rather, we deal with a case of first
impression. Not having been asked to make a change in existing law or to
overrule or modify any case or to expand any right given by Congress, we need
in this case no signal from that body. 69
After reviewing the reasons for its previous holdings and further explicating those rationales, the
CCPA found both GE’s and Upjohn’s organisms to be patentable.70 The patent office again
appealed the ruling and the Supreme Court granted certiorari,71 but the Upjohn lawyers withdrew
their application for a product patent on their antibiotic-producing microorganism before the
Court heard oral argument.72 Thus, the Bergy appeal was dismissedby the Supreme Court as
moot in 1980,73 and the Court announced its holding only as to Chakrabarty’s claim, affirming
the ruling of the CCPA.74
The legal precedent and the lower court opinions in Chakrabarty provide a revealing
glimpse of the legal case for patentability of living organisms at the time of the decision, and
demonstrate the inaccuracy of the Court’s portrayal of its holding as one clearly mandated by
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law. Before the Chakrabarty case, no court had stated that living organisms were patentable, and
conventional wisdom within the bar as well as somewhat ambiguous court dicta suggested the
opposite. The Supreme Court had only two years earlier in Flook cautioned against expanding
the boundaries of patent law without clear congressional authorization, and the Court’s remand
of the Bergy and Chakrabarty cases in 1979 with a direction to consider Flook suggests that the
Court was considering just such a problem in those cases. The Court in Chakrabarty was faced
with an issue of first impression, ambiguous statutory language, and an at least arguable claim
(based on the two Plant Acts) that Congress did not intend living things to be patentable. The
Court could have easily crafted an opinion holding against Chakrabarty, thus avoiding the
significant controversy – which certainly must have been anticipated by the Court – that
followed the decision. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chakrabarty was therefore far from a
basic exercise in statutory interpretation; it was a conscious assertion of Court authority to
advance the law with changing times.
1.3: The Public Response
The controversial nature of the Court’s holding in Chakrabarty is confirmed by the
media reports and legal press about the decision, which describe a flurry of public praise and
criticism of the Court following Chakrabarty. These accounts also indicate a public recognition
that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Chakrabarty contained a call for a
Congressional response. Media reports of the time suggest an expectation that such a legislative
response might soon be forthcoming.
In a June 17, 1980 article reporting the decision, Linda Greenhouse of the New York
Times wrote that “the opinion was hailed and denounced in the sweeping language that has
characterized much of the debate since the Court agreed last October to decide the issue,” and
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quoted the People’s Business Commission, a non-profit organization that had filed an amicus
brief in the case, as stating that “[t]he Brave New World that Aldous Huxley warned of is now
here.”75 The article also quoted Genentech, Inc., a genetic engineering company that had also
filed an amicus brief, proclaiming that “[t]he Court has assured this country’s technological
future.”76 The same day, the Washington Post reported that the decision was “one of the most
controversial of the past decade.”77
Media reports following the opinion noted the bold nature of the Court’s holding. In a
1984 article about the Supreme Court’s most recent opinions related to new technology, Fred
Barbash of the Washington Post wrote of the assertiveness of the Chakrabarty Court’s vision of
its role with respect to Congress. The article described the decision as a sign of the Court’s new
willingness to meet the demands of science by expanding legal protection, even absent a specific
Congressional mandate:
Slowly and reluctantly, the justices are beginning to confront novel
legal questions arising from the rush of high technology. And their most
recent opinions indicate that they have no intention of standing in the way
of this rush without explicit instructions from Congress. It is not the place
of the federal judiciary to put the brakes on these developments, the court
is saying, whether confronted with demands that it save the entertainment
industry, as in the Sony case, or the world, as in [Chakrabarty].78
In articles both favorable to and opposed to the Court’s ruling in Chakrabarty, press and
legal writers recognized the importance of Congress’s next move in determining the decision’s
ultimate legacy. In the Christian Science Monitor, Robert Cowen wrote shortly after
Chakrabarty that the holding left the real decision as to the patentability of living organisms to
“society as a whole,” via the mouthpiece of Congress:79
In ruling that a "man-made" microbe is patentable, the US Supreme Court
has resolved a narrow legal question and issued an awesome challenge. The
people of the United States, through their elected representatives and legislative
bodies, must decide the extent to which they believe humans should seek to
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manipulate organic life at its fundamental level and under what restraints this
should be done. The courts cannot make that decision for them.80
In a case note on the decision, the Harvard Law Review praised the Court’s willingness to take
an assertive stand in broadening the law to accommodate new technologies, but noted that
Congress had much work to do in the wake of the decision:
Whether microorganisms should be patentable is a policy judgment that
must be considered in light of the efficacy and purpose of the patent system itself.
Because even the important patent issues arising in connection with
microbiological research are ancillary to far broader scientific, social, and ethical
issues, they should await comprehensive congressional review of microbiological
and genetic research.81
Media reports of the time expressed the general sense that Chakrabarty “[left] open more
questions than it answer[ed],” and that the Court’s decision was simply a first step in an area that
Congress would ultimately mold through detailed legislation.82
1.4: After Chakrabarty
At the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, 114 patents applications
involving new life forms were pending in the PTO, and new applications were coming in every
day.83 Following the decision, the PTO began to grant applications on microorganisms such as
Chakrabarty’s, although these grants were delayed for several months due to processing
difficulties.84 It remained unclear whether animals could be patented, however, and the PTO
stated no position on this matter for several years.
The issue was finally resolved in 1987, when Ex Parte Allen came before the Board.85
The case involved a patent application for polyploid oysters (oysters with three sets of
chromosomes rather than two), which were sterile and grew to be larger than ordinary oysters, an
appealing trait for commercial use.86 The patent examiner rejected the application because the
oysters were living organisms, citing In re Merat,87 and the Board reversed this finding, stating
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that Diamond v. Chakrabarty had held decisively that living organisms were patentable.88 In
broad language, the Board declared that “the issue, in our view, in determining whether the
claimed subject matter is patentable under § 101 is simply whether the subject matter is made by
man.”89
The Board’s decision in Ex Parte Allen forced the PTO to change its policy, and soon
after the holding, in April 1987, it released an announcement stating explicitly that multi-cellular
organisms, including animals, were now patentable subject matter.90 In the announcement, the
PTO noted that humans were excluded from this policy based on a Constitutional prohibition –
presumably under the Thirteenth Amendment’s slavery provision.91 The announcement appeared
in the Official Gazette of the Patent Office:
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring
non- human multi-cellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable
subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . . A claim directed to or
including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be patentable
subject matter within 35 U.S.C. § 101. The grant of a limited, but exclusive
property right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution.92

Based on the new policy, the United States became the first country in the world to permit the
patenting of animals.93 Unsurprisingly, the change was met with severe disapproval by some
groups, and a coalition of animal rights and public policy groups formed almost immediately to
block the change.94
On April 12, 1988, the first patent on a living multi-cellular organism was issued to
Harvard University for the “Harvard mouse,” a mouse genetically engineered to develop a type
of cancer useful as a model for human breast cancer.95 Several law suits challenging the action
were filed, including Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,96 a suit by animal husbandry groups,
animal rights groups, and farmers claiming that the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
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had failed to comply with various requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in
promulgating the new animal patent policy. The Federal Circuit dismissed the suit for lack of
standing.97
After granting a patent on the Harvard mouse, the PTO did not approve any further
animal patents for nearly five years. 98 The agency did not offer an explanation for this unofficial
moratorium, but as a New York Times reporter put it, the agency “apparently got cold feet” in
response to the controversy surrounding the Harvard mouse.99 In 1992, the PTO resumed
issuance of such patents, authorizing three patents on mice that, like the Harvard mouse, were
genetically engineered to provide models for human disease.100 Scores of animal patent
approvals followed.101 The rush of animal patenting in the early 1990’s raised the public profile
of the issue, and Congress, which had first paid surprisingly little attention to Chakrabarty,
began to take notice.
PART II: THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
As described in Part I, the public expectedthatafter the

Chakrabarty decision, Congress

would evaluate the permissibility of patenting living organisms. Both the majority and dissent in
the case suggested that Congress should consider the issue; the majority declared that the policy
repercussions of its decision were “a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative
process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide
and courts cannot,”102 and the dissent argued that “the courts should leave to Congress the
decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege.”103 Media reports of the time noted
the possibility of a congressional response, and commentators suggested that the Chakrabarty
Court had “issued an awesome challenge” to the legislature.104
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The obvious question, then, is whether Congress did respond, and if so, what form did the
response take? In this section, I give detailed consideration to the congressional action (or lack
thereof) related to the patentability of living organisms that followed the Chakrabarty decision.
2.1: In the Wake of Chakrabarty
A week after the Chakrabarty decision, a meeting sponsored in part by the House
Committee on Science and Technology was organized in Washington to discuss the significance
of the decision.105 Patent lawyers, scientists, and congressmen all voiced their views at the
meeting. Representative George Brown, a Democrat from California and the chairman of the
House Science, Research, and Technology Subcommittee, cautioned that many members of the
public had “genuine and deeply felt” apprehensions about the type of research Chakrabarty
would encourage.106 Jonathan King, a professor of biology at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, argued that Congress should pass legislation explicitly prohibiting the patenting of
living organisms.107 Representative Robert Drinan, a Democrat from Massachusetts, disagreed,
arguing that Congress should wait and learn more about the technology before it acted, adding
“[w]e make enough mistakes on matters we think we understand.”108
While the courts and many pundits seem to have expected a legislative evaluation of
Chakrabarty to follow the decision, congressional observers suggested that Congress was
unlikely to act in the near future. A week after the decision, U.S. News & World Report noted
that although the Chakrabarty Court “left the door open for Congress to amend the laws and set
regulatory policy on the new research technology … congressional sources indicate that no
changes in the law to upset the Supreme Court ruling are imminent.”109 Similarly, Chemical
Week reported that while “[t]he high court left open the door to some form of ban on patents for
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living organisms … Congressional observers … consider remote any move by Congress to
change the patent law in this direction.”110
These predictions proved to be accurate – no noteworthy reports, debates, or legislation
related to Chakrabarty emerged from Congress in the first seven years following the decision.
This lack of congressional interest was notable considering the public controversy surrounding
the decision and the reference to important policy implications of the holding in the amicus
briefs and majority and dissenting opinions in the case. Despite this apparent need for legislative
attention, it was only after the Board interpreted Chakrabarty to permit animal patenting in Ex
Parte Allen that significant legislative interest in the decision emerged.
2.2: After Ex Parte Allen
Just as Chakrabarty had, Ex Parte Allen and the PTO’s subsequent announcement that it
would approve animal patents let loose a storm of protest. Religious leaders and animal-welfare
groups argued that patenting animals was unethical and would damage humanity’s relationship
with nature, while farmers’ organizations worried that patents for superior breeds of animals
resulting from genetic engineering would be owned and controlled by a few large companies.111
As a result, several congressmen adopted the Chakrabarty issueas a central political cause .
2.2.1: An Early Bill and the House Subcommittee Hearings
In May of 1987, just one month after theBoard ’ decision in Ex Parte Allen and almost a
year before the patenting of the Harvard mouse, Senator Mark Hatfield, a Republican from
Oregon, proposed an amendment to a supplementary appropriations bill, prohibiting the use of
appropriated funds for the patenting of genetically modified animals.112 The amendment, which
would in essence prevent the PTO from considering or granting patent applications for animals
until 1988, was adopted by the Senate without debate.113 Perhaps hoping that compromise would
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ease political tensions, the PTO voluntarily agreed not to patent any animals through fiscal year
1987 before the amendment could be considered in the House of Representatives.114
While the appropriations amendment was still pending in June, Representative Robert
Kastenmeier, a Democrat from Wisconsin, initiated a set of hearings on the subject through the
House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice (CCLAJ)
within the Committee on the Judiciary. Kastenmeier announced that the purpose of the hearings,
which were entitled “Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals,” was “to assess the
myriad of questions which arise from decisions to issue patents to genetically altered plants and
animals,”115 including “moral and philosophical questions.”116 The hearings spanned four days
and produced a 931-page record.117 Over thirty witnesses, including patent lawyers, law and
biology professors, religious leaders, bioethics experts, anti-genetic engineering activists,
biotechnology company representatives, and farmers’ advocates gave testimony at the hearings,
and discussed both legal and policy considerations relevant to the patenting of animals.118
At the hearings, Kastenmeier expressed a lack of confidence in both the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chakrabarty and the Board of Appeal’s holding in Allen, as well as in the Patent and
Trademark Commissioner’s ability to interpret §101 appropriately. He explicitly questioned the
authority of the Chakrabarty decision, finding it “troubling” that “we tend to interpret
[Chakrabarty] as the law of the land,” despite the fact that “[i]t was not only a five to four
decision, but two members of the majority are not even on the Court now.” Thus, “even though it
remains the law, [the Chakrabarty ] view is not shared by everybody,” Kastenmeier stated.119 In
response to a witness who hoped that Congress would overturn Chakrabarty, however,
Kastenmeier was not supportive, stating clearly, “[a]s far as microorganisms is [sic] concerned,
that is already a lost cause…. I do not think that Chakrabarty will be repealed judicially or
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otherwise.”120 Kastenmeier suggested that Congress could have properly evaluated and perhaps
reacted to the ruling in Chakrabarty if it had responded earlier, and that if Congress did not
review the implications of the PTO announcement immediately, that opportunity might pass in
the same way:
[W]hen it was a question of microorganisms in the Chakrabarty case,
people sort of shrugged their shoulders. But as it has now ascended to mammals
and vertebrates, more people are concerned about implications, and if somebody
does not look at it now … then it may be too late.
At least I would want to feel that we made a conscious decision in 1987…
that we have not allowed policies to eventuate which we cannot cope with later
on…. Speak now or forever hold your peace, so to speak; that is the position we
are in.121
One of Kastenmeier’s primary concerns appeared to be patenting of human beings; although the
PTO had announced its position that humans were unpatentable under the Constitution,
Kastenmeier suggested that a future administration could change that view unless Congress
enacted a ban on patenting of human beings into law.122
Other speakers at the hearing argued both for and against congressional legislation on
animal patents. Dr. Tegtmayer, the Assistant Commissioner for Patents at the PTO, stated that
while she commended the Chairman of the Subcommittee for holding the hearing, and believed
that animal patentability “is a good area to have a dialogue in,” the PTO position “at the present
time is that we do not see any particular need to address this issue with legislation.”123 Reid
Adler, a patent attorney who argued for an expansive interpretation of § 101, disagreed, claiming
that the PTO Commissioner was overly conservative, and had “a poor track record in supporting
novel, frontier technologies.” He claimed that the Commissioner had refused to apply
Chakrabarty appropriately until the Board forced it to, and recommended that “Congress require
annual reports from the PTO on the Commissioner’s administrative determinations under §101
of any types of subject matter that are excluded from patentability.”124 At the same time, other
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witnesses argued vehemently that Congress should restrict the Patent Office’s ability to expand
the category of patentable subject matter.125
The 1987 House Subcommittee hearings did not produce one clear policy proposal, but
they provided a wealth of information about the competing claims and values involved in the
animal patent controversy, and demonstrated that Congress was willing to carefully address the
policy issues surrounding Chakrabarty. In a sense, the hearings had bolstered the position of the
Chakrabarty majority; they appeared to be precisely the type of “investigation, examination, and
study” that the Chakrabarty majority had left to Congress, suggesting that the legislature was
uniquely capable in that role.126
In the seven years following the hearings, ten bills prohibiting or regulating animal
patenting were proposed in the House or Senate, but none passed, and most never emerged from
committee. New proposals ceased to emerge not long after the PTO resumed approving animal
patent applications in 1992, and the issue seemed dead until quite recently, when the human
cloning controversy revived the Chakrabarty issue, this time in relation to patenting of human
beings. Although the proposed bills (described below) differed from one another in several
respects, the comments of the Representatives and Senators supporting them were quite
strikingly similar. Most suggested that Congress had disregarded its obligation to make law in
the area related to Chakrabarty, and many specifically denounced both the Supreme Court and
the PTO for inappropriately co-opting the legislative role.
2.2.2: Proposals in the late 1980s
In August of 1987, Representative Charles Rose, a Democrat from North Carolina,
proposed a bill to impose a two-year moratorium on the patenting of “animals altered through
genetic engineering technology.”127 The CCLAJ Subcommittee rejected this legislation the
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following year.128 In February of 1988, Senator Hatfield proposed an almost identical
moratorium bill.129 Presenting the bill in the Senate, Hatfield contrasted the executive role of the
Patent Office with the legislative role of the Congress:.
[T]he Patent Office itself admits that it does not take ethical or moral
considerations into account when assessing an application for a patent. It is, I
believe, the responsibility of Congress to fully consider what kind of
technological creativity we wish to encourage through the patenting process, and
I believe the giant leap to animal patenting provides us with the specific example
we need to conduct such a debate.130
In Hatfield’s view, Congress should consider “the ethical implications of the creation, and
exclusive rights to, an animal never before existing in nature.”131 He cautioned that he did not
wish to halt genetic engineering, “a revolutionary science that may produce results nothing short
of miraculous,” but only to provide time for Congress to fulfill its duty by carefully considering
the issues involved.132 Hatfield’s bill was referred to the Senate Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks, where it failed.133
In June of 1988, three months after the patenting of the Harvard mouse, Representative
Kastenmeier introduced a bill proposing a different response to the PTO’s animal patenting
announcement. Most relevantly, the bill did not prohibit patenting of animals, but declared that
human beings were not patentable subject matter and, to protect farmers’ interests, that a farmer
would not be guilty of patent infringement based on reproducing, using, or selling patented
transgenic farm animals (but prohibited the selling of germ cells, semen, or embryos of such
animals).134 On the floor of the House, Kastenmeier stated that the bill represented the
conclusion of the extensive hearings held by the CCLAJ Subcommittee and run by him in 1987,
and that it provided a better solution than the various moratorium bills suggested by his
colleagues.135 Kastenmeier argued that no moratorium bill was likely to pass in Congress, and
that regardless, a moratorium “does not answer the fundamental questions.”136 Representative
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Carlos Moorhead, a Republican from California who also spoke in favor of the bill, argued that
based on the information provided by the hearings, there was no evidence that research involving
transgenic animals was dangerous or unethical, but that if at some point such research did
become dangerous, “Congress has the ability to monitor research and development in this area
and as soon as we detect abuse we can move in and remedy the situation.”137 Thus Moorhead,
like Hatfield and Kastenmeier, believed that Congress had an obligation to actively monitor the
Chakrabarty issue. Another Congressman who rose to speak in favor of the bill, Representative
Hamilton Fish of New York, a Republican, suggested that the public did not want a ban on
patenting of genetically engineered animals, noting that a Public Perception Survey had found
that “83 percent [of those polled] favor using genetically engineered organisms on a small scale
for medical research” and “42 percent favored use on a large scale basis.”138
Kastenmeier’s bill passed in the House in September of 1988 and was referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, but the Senate never considered the measure.139 Kastenmeier
introduced the bill again in 1989,140 stating “[i]t is my hope that given the extensive work done
on this issue by the House that the Senate will turn to [it] early this Congress.”141 The bill was
referred to the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice in March of 1989, and the Subcommittee held hearings on the subject in September, but
the bill never emerged from the Subcommittee.142
At about the same time, Representative Benjamin Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland,
proposed another bill imposing a 2-year moratorium on the granting of animal patents, with a
new exception for “animals the commercialization of which is subject to a Federal regulatory
review and approval process.”143 Cardin, like Senator Hatfield a year earlier, emphasized the
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distinct roles of the PTO and Congress, and suggested that Congress had derogated from its
obligation to decide significant policy issues:
It is the Congress’ duty, not PTO’s, to determine whether living
organisms, like plants and animals, are patentable. Congress saw the need for this
type of active involvement [in enacting the plant patent acts]. With regard to the
patenting of animals, however, it was the PTO, not Congress, that decided in
1987 that nonhuman animals constituted patentable subject matter. The PTO
stepped in to fill the void. But it is time for Congress to become more involved in
the debate.144
Cardin’s declaration that it is “Congress’ duty” to decide whether living organisms are patentable
implied a subtle criticism of the Supreme Court’s holding in Chakrabarty, which in essence
decided this question withoutcongressional input. This implied rebuke was emphasized by
Cardin’s proposal of a comprehensive review of the patent laws: “I believe we have reached the
point at which we must examine whether our patent system is keeping up with technology,” he
stated.145 In proposing to adapt the patent laws to changing technology, Cardin suggested that the
Supreme Court’s attempt to do just that in Chakrabarty was an imposition on Congress’s proper
jurisdiction. Cardin’s moratorium bill, like those that had preceded it, failed to emerge from
House subcommittee.146
Three months later, in February of 1990, Senator Hatfield proposed another moratorium
bill in the Senate, this time for a five-year span,147 declaring, “the patenting of animals blurs the
distinction between man’s work and God’s work.”148 Like Cardin, Hatfield emphasized the
obligation of Congress to make policy determinations, and his rebuke of the Supreme Court and
the Patent Office was strongly worded. He argued that traditionally, living things were
appropriately not considered to be patentable under the law because they were “in the public
ownership.”149 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court had reversed that position in Chakrabarty,
despite a plea by the dissent (which was in the right, Hatfield implied) to leave such issues to the
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Congress.150 The patent office had then made things worse by “unilaterally extending the holding
in Chakrabarty” to permit animal patenting.151 In Hatfield’s view, this “represents a vast, unique
and deeply troubling usurpation of Congressional authority … [and] denies the public the
traditional legislative process for the protection of their rights.”152 Thus, Hatfield declared
blatantly that the courts and the PTO had encroached upon congressional authority: “My
legislation to rescind this patent office decision simply maintains the status quo, by returning
major patenting decisions to the correct and traditional forum, Congress.”153 Like his earlier
proposal, Hatfield’s bill failed in committee.154
Just as those congressmen in favor of a moratorium on animal patenting persisted in
proposing a new bill each year, Representative Kastenmeier continued to argue in favor of his
alternative proposal allowing the patenting of living organisms. In September of 1990,
Kastenmeier reintroduced his bill in almost identical form (except that the prohibition on sale by
farmers of farm animal germ cells, sperm, eggs, and embryos was eliminated), as part of the
larger Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990.155 The bill was
referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which produced a report in October.156 The report
stated that the bill would provide support for the basic holding in Ex Parte Allen, but made clear
that the Committee viewed the PTO’s actions as inappropriately co-opting the legislative role:
[The bill,] by statutorily clarifying that transgenic animals are patentable
and that transgenic human beings are not presumes that the patent and trademark
office did usurp Congressional prerogatives, but agrees with the substance of the
PTO decision as to patentability of transgenic animals. …157
Although the Commissioner had announced his position that human beings could not be patented
under the U.S. Constitution, the report stated that a statutory clarification on the subject was
necessary because “the Commissioner is totally without authority to resolve constitutional
issues,”158 and his statement “does not even detail the precise grounds for the position”; thus it
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“must be read as raising the issue, and not resolving it.”159 The report echoed Hatfield’s and
Cardin’s explicit criticisms of the PTO and more subtle criticisms of the Supreme Court, stating
that the Patent Office “unilaterally and bureaucratically” decided to allow patenting of animals
by “bootstrapping from the rather highly contested decision in the Chakrabarty case.”160 If the
human patents issue would be subject to the same type of “administrative caprice” by the PTO as
was the animal patents issue, the report declared, congressional action was clearly necessary.161
The report also pointedly noted its agreement with the Chakrabarty dissent’s view that “[t]he
courts should leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege
into areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not available.”162 The new
version of Kastenmeier’s bill did not advance beyond the publishing of the report, and like its
predecessor, failed in committee.163
2.2.3: The Last Gasp for Animal Patenting Legislation
In the early 1990s, three more bills were introduced in Congress proposing a moratorium
on animal patenting. Senator Hatfield in 1991 and Representative Cardin in 1992 introduced
identical five-year moratorium bills in the Senate and House, and in 1993, Senator Hatfield
introduced a final two-year moratorium bill in the Senate which, in addition to an animal
patenting moratorium, included a moratorium on patenting of “human tissues, fluids, cells, [and]
genes or gene sequences.”164 All of the bills failed in committee, and since 1993, no new bills on
animal patenting have been proposed. The lack of new bills was perhaps in part due to the fact
that the Patent Office lifted its voluntary moratorium on the issuing of animal patents in 1992 –
in 1991, there were more than 140 patents on animals pending in the Patent Office,165 and as
these patents began to be granted, it is likely that the fight became much harder to win.
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In their comments introducing their legislation, Hatfield and Cardin repeated well-worn
themes, arguing that “Congress must act now if it is ever going to have the opportunity to
examine the effects genetically engineered animals will have upon our environment.”166 In
introducing his 1993 bill, Hatfield again criticized Congress’ inaction, and suggested that the
PTO’s cessation of its unofficial moratorium on animal patents a year earlier was the direct result
of this passivity: “In my view, [the PTO ended the moratorium] because they can realistically
wait no longer for ethical guidance from Congress.”167 Both Cardin and Hatfield also drew
attention to lobbying activity surrounding the bills. After introducing his 1992 bill,
Representative Cardin included in the record a list of fifteen animal rights and farming groups
that supported his legislation.168 Senator Hatfield criticized the intense lobbying efforts of groups
opposed to his 1993 legislation, claiming that the Association of Biotechnology Companies and
the Industrial Biotechnology Association had used “highly questionable tactics” in lobbying
against his bill.169 None of these appeals seemed to work – neither congressman’s legislation
progressed beyond committee.
2.3: The Current Human Patentability Debate
In the late 1990’s, Congress appeared to lose interest in the implications of patenting
living organisms, but the issue of human patentability has recently reappeared as part of the
larger human cloning controversy. In June 2002, Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from
Kansas, proposed legislation prohibiting the patenting of “human organisms.”170 This bill was
distinct from another bill proposed by Brownback specifically to ban human cloning, but debate
on the patent bill was nonetheless dominated by discussions about the problems with cloning
human embryos. In the Senate floor debate, Brownback declared that Congress must be wary of
those “who are contending that the young human at various stages – an embryo – is not a person,
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therefore is patentable; that a person can be patented because it is a piece of property.”171
Brownback argued that he was proposing the bill “to make it clear to the Patent Office, [to] the
people of America, the people around the world, that you can’t patent a person at any stage or
age of its development and growth.”172 He later added: “We all know this debate is really about
the future of humanity.”173
Senator Hatch, a Republican from Utah, accused Brownback of planting a “red herring”
by shifting the debate about the permissibility of human cloning to a bill on patenting,174 a
charge that did not seem far-fetched in view of Brownback’sfocus on the ethics of human
cloning itself rather than on patents during his floor speeches. “I am greatly concerned,” Hatch
stated, “that in filing this particular amendment, our opponents in this debate are resorting to
tactics that will not result in the careful consideration that this important issue merits.”175 Hatch
also suggested that the amendment was unnecessary, since the PTO already had a policy
prohibiting patenting of humans. (Interestingly, the Patent Office had announced that it no longer
based this policy on Thirteenth Amendment grounds, but rather on the fact that it had not
received guidance from Congress or the courts on the issue.176) Hatch added that the patent issue
should most properly be examined by the Judiciary Committee, and that “[w]e need to know
what, if any, tensions exist between the Brownback Amendment and the Supreme Court’s
holding in the famous Chakrabarty decision.”177 Brownback conceded that the Patent Office
prohibited human patenting, but argued that the PTO policy was being challenged in court, and
declared, “[w]hat I am providing by this amendment is clarity by the legislative body.”178 After
significant debate on the issue, Brownback’s amendment never reached a vote in the Senate.179
In July of 2003, Representative David Weldon, a Republican from Florida, proposed an
amendment to a House appropriations bill prohibiting funding for the issuing of patents on
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claims “directed to or encompassing a human organism.”180 In comments about the amendment,
Weldon has insisted that it is simply a restatement of the Patent Office’s position against
patenting of human beings, rather than, as some lobbying organizations have claimed, an attempt
to broaden the scope of the policy to prohibit patents on stem cell lines or procedures for creating
human embryos.181 The House of Representatives approved Weldon’s amendment in the month
that it was proposed,182 but the bill never proceeded further.
2.4: The Congressional Perspective on Chakrabarty
Congressional discussion of Chakrabarty in thenearly quarter of a century since the
holding has had a consistently negative tone, with a focus on the perceived aggressiveness of the
Court. Congress never overturned the decision, however, nor did it significantly modify it.
Congress evinced a curious lack of interest immediately after the decision, which was followed
by attempts by a small number of Congressmen at modifying the holding in the wake of the
Board of Patent Appeals’ expansive interpretation of it. These Congressmen generally viewed
Chakrabarty as a dangerous usurpation of the congressional role, and forcefully asserted
Congress’ duty to legislate in the area, particularly where necessary to prevent other branches
from filling the void. Ultimately, these efforts to pass legislation on the issue failed. As described
below, this failure could have been due to a variety of factors, and does not necessarily indicate
that Congress as a whole was indifferent to the issue or approved of the decision. The next
section considers the significance of the congressional response to Chakrabarty in light of
contemporary academic scholarship.
PART III: DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE COURT
The Supreme Court acted aggressively in Chakrabarty, interpreting § 101 broadly, with
little support from statutory language or legislative history. The Court justified this foray into an
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area with potentially complex policy implications by suggesting that if Congress disapproved of
the Court’s decision or wanted to alter it in some way, it could respond appropriately. Congress
did not respond until seven years later, when Chakrabarty was interpreted by the Patent Office to
apply to animals. Even then, each legislative bill proposed in Congress to modify or overturn the
holding failed to pass.
This history sheds some light on the relationship between the Supreme Court and
Congress, but its import is not entirely clear. Did Congress respond to Chakrabarty as the Court
expected or hoped it to? Was Congress’s inability to pass a bill modifying or overruling the
Chakrabarty decision an indication that the Court’s interpretation of § 101 was “correct” in some
sense? Recent academic literature concerning statutory interpretation and the interactions
between the Supreme Court and Congress helps answer these questions.
3.1: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation with an Eye to Congress
The Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in Chakrabarty is consistent
with a method proposed by Professor William Eskridge in his 1987 article, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation,183 and expanded in his 1991 article, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions [hereinafter “Overriding”].184
In Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Eskridge criticizes the “originalist” model of
statutory interpretation, and urges courts to update interpretations of statutes in conformity with
social changes. According to Eskridge, the originalist approach, which focuses on the original
intent of the drafters of the statute, fails because the legislature cannot consider every issue that
may come up in relation to the statute, and “[a]s society changes, adapts to the statute, and
generates new variations of the problem which gave rise to the statute, the unanticipated gaps
and ambiguities proliferate.”185 These gaps lead originalist judges to produce out-of-date and
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counter-productive statutory interpretations thatdo not do justice to the legislature’s interests in
enacting the statute, Eskridge claims.186 Only through dynamic statutory interpretation can the
judiciary properly advance the legislature’s vision and “contribute to the legitimacy of our
government as a whole.”187
Eskridge envisions a continuum of cases. On one end of the continuum are cases that
involve a recently drafted statute, a detailed statutorytext , and a historical context indicating that
the legislature deliberated on the relevant issue and decided it – for these cases, Eskridge says,
the language of the text should control the result, because a textual reading is likely to accurately
reflect both current social understandings and original legislative interests.188 On the other end of
the continuum are cases involving an old statute with general or ambiguous language, a societal
or legal context greatly transformed since the statute’s drafting, and little indication that the
original drafters considered the relevant interpretive question – in those cases, Eskridge claims,
the judge should update the statute in accordance with the changed societal context, giving little
heed to the original intentions of the drafters.189 Eskridge argues that the further a case falls
along this continuum, the freer a judge should feel to interpret the statute aggressively and use
the “evolutive” context of the case to adapt the statute to a contemporary setting.190
Chakrabarty presents a case on the far end of Eskridge’s continuum. The statute in
question, 35 U.S.C. § 101, was passed in 1952, almost thirty years before Chakrabarty, and its
language was taken almost verbatim from a statute passed in 1793.191 The wording of §101 is
very general, and the language is ambiguous as to the permissibility of patenting living
organisms. There is no indication that either the 1952 or 1793 Congress had considered the issue
of patenting life forms. Most importantly, the social context had changed significantly in the ten
years prior to theChakrabarty decision: the development of recombinant DNA technology and
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the increasingly clear potential of genetic engineering had raised the stakes enormously on the
issue of patenting living organisms. Congress in 1952 could nothave anticipated the issue that
was in essence decided by the Chakrabarty Court: whether patent incentives should be used to
encourage the development of the genetic engineering field. Thus, under Eskridge’s view, the
Chakrabarty Court should have felt no compulsion to stay true to either the statutory text of §101
or the drafting Congress’ original legislative intent.
In Overriding, Eskridge describes an exhaustive study he performed of Congressional
responses to statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court (discussed in more detail below), and
expands on his theory of statutory interpretation based on his findings. Eskridge describes a
“sequential game” model of interaction between the institutions that create, interpret, and enforce
statutes:
The model posits that a dynamic game exists between the Court, the relevant
congressional committees, Congress, and the President. In this game, ultimate
statutory policy is set through a sequential process by which each player –
including the Court – tries to impose its policy preferences. The game is a
dynamic one because each player is responsive to the preferences of other players
and because the preferences of the players change as information is generated and
distributed in the game.192
As part of this game, Eskridge suggests that the Supreme Court prefers not to be overridden by
Congress, and thus intentionally interprets statutes as the current Congress would interpret them
where it knows that Congress would otherwise override its judgments.193 Under this theory, the
Court’s decisions should closely mirror the current legislature’s preferences, except in the
marginal area in which Congress cannot or is unwilling to overturn a Court holding. Eskridge
posits that this behavior is at least a partial explanation for the relative dearth of Congressional
overrides of Supreme Court decisions.194 Because the Court is careful to interpret statutes so as
not to be overridden by Congress, Congress tends to override Court interpretations only where
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Congressional preferences have changed over time, where the Court misinterpreted
Congressional preferences, or where the Court actually invited a Congressional override for
institutional reasons.195
In Eskridge’s view, this empirically observable behavior by the Courtis often
normatively valuable – he suggests that such a strategy eliminates the need for Congress to
constantly revisit and update statutes, thus improving legislative efficiency and advancing the
legislature’s goals.196 Eskridge also claims, however, that an interpretive approach based strongly
on current legislative intent may be too majoritarian at times, ignoring the preferences of
underprivileged groups that lack political representation.197 Eskridge argues that the Court should
sometimes adopt a deliberately countermajoritarian, normative approach, acting as the
“conscience of the nation's pluralism by bringing attention to interests that go unrepresented in
Washington and values that are overlooked.”198
3.2: Eskridge and the Chakrabarty Holding
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chakrabarty conforms with the approach to statutory
interpretation described by Eskridge in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. Although it is less
clear whether the Court explicitly attempted to avoid an override from Congress as described by
Eskridge in Overriding, the Court’s opinion and the response of Congress to the decision is
consistent with this model.
In dismissing the relevance of the cautionary language in Flook, the Courtin
Chakrabarty declared that it was the judiciary’s role to interpret statutesin conformity with
changing technology, particularly in the area of patent law:
Flook did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated
by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se. To read
that concept into Flook would frustrate the purposes of the patent law. This Court
frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the ‘particular
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application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.’ … This is especially true in
the field of patent law.199
This language fits comfortably within the dynamic statutory interpretation model. T he
Chakrabarty Court suggested that since advancing technologies continuously alter the legal
scope and significance of patent law, courts must be free to modify their interpretations of
relevant statutes to remain consistent with the contemporarycontext. Just as Eskridge suggests,
the Court considered “not only what the legislation mean[t] abstractly … but also what it ought
to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society.”200
Of course, the Court in Chakrabarty did not explicitly adopt an aggressive interpretive
posture. Its statements that “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide scope”201 and that“ Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely
because such inventions are often unforeseeable”202 suggest that the holding was based on simple
statutory interpretation – if Congress deliberately drafted §101 expansively with the hope that the
Court would adapt the statute to unforeseen technologies, the Court’s authorization of
Chakrabarty’s patent could be considered entirely consistent with the text.
While this view has some merit, it cannot, however, transform theChakrabarty holding
into a conservative exercise in basic statutory interpretation. The Court’s interpretation of §101
as evincing a Congressional intention to allow expansion of the patent laws far beyond what was
foreseen at the time was itself an assertive choice, conducive to the dynamic interpretive
approach and not in any sense required by the text of the §101. This point is evident in light of
both legal precedent on the issue and the Court’s own previous statements, as described in Part I.
Just two years earlier in Flook, the Court had rejected the view that section §101 permitted the
Court to expand the scope of patent law whenever new technologies demanded it, noting that
“we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
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unforeseen by Congress.”203 The Court in Flook stated explicitly thatexpansion of the patent
privilege must be “based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language,” and
that a “clear and certain signal from Congress” would be required before approving a broader
scope to patent protection than previously described by the courts.204 The statutory language was
clearly ambiguous as tothe permissibility of patenting life, no “clear and certain signal” had
emerged from Congress, and although legal precedent on the issue was not entirely clear-cut,
courts had never permitted patents on living organisms in the past. Under the Court’s own
formula in Flook, then, the appropriate response would have been to reject Chakrabarty’s
application and allow Congress to address the issue. Instead, the Court reversed its position in
Flook and permitted an unprecedented, highly controversial expansion of the patent privilege.
This decision can be explained only as a quite pragmatic adoption of a dynamic interpretive
approach.
Whether the Supreme Court considered the possibility of a Congressional override in
coming to its decision in Chakrabarty, as Eskridge’s argument in Overriding would suggest, is
impossible to say – such behavior can be researched only through large scale studies, as Eskridge
has done. Interestingly, despite all of the activity in Congress in opposition to the Chakrabarty
holding over more than a decade, the decision has never been overridden by the legislature. This
result is at least consistent with Eskridge’s thesis.
3.3: Criticisms of Eskridge’s Approach
Statutory interpretation has enjoyed significant academic attention in recent years, and a
number of theorists have proposed important alternatives to Eskridge’s approach. The
Chakrabarty case provides an intriguing lens through which to consider some of these
alternatives.
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3.3.1: Manning and Textualism
Professor John Manning, a leading adherent of the textualist doctrine, suggests that to
properly fulfill their roles as faithful agents of the legislature, judges should enforce only the
plain meaning of a statute as written, even if this occasionally requires allowing absurd results.205
Manning argues against the use of legislative history or any other extra-statutory tool that might
illuminate what Congress “really intended” as to a particular issue, suggesting that “the
legislative process is simply too complex and too opaque to permit judges to get inside
Congress's ‘mind.’”206 Any concept of genuine collective legislative intent distinct from that
expressed in the statutory text is meaningless, Manning claims.207 Manning also argues that the
use of legislative history allows Congress to unconstitutionally delegate its legislative power to
the courts; textualism prevents such delegation, he suggests, by requiring Congress to fully
elucidate the meaning of a statute in the text of the statute itself.208
One could argue that Chakrabarty was actually decided under the textualist rubric. Since
§101 states that the inventor or discoverer of “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter … may obtain a patent therefore,” and provides no
exception for living organisms, the Chakrabarty bacterium would seem to fit easily within the
plain text of the statute. As discussed above, the Supreme Court described its holding in the case
as an uncontroversial exercise of basic statutory interpretation. But if Chakrabarty was a passive
textualist decision, why was the holding considered by the media to be an “awesome challenge”
to Congress, and why did several members of Congress describe the decision on the house floor
as an unwarranted judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives?
The problem is that the legal precedent and conventional wisdom that had developed
since the enactment of §101 strongly suggested that living organisms were unpatentable. Where
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a solid legal position on an issue has built up over many decades and is supported by
conventional wisdom within society, as in Chakrabarty, the Court’s holding in contravention of
that position, even if consistent with the plain meaning of a statute, cannot reasonably be
considered faithful to the spirit of textualist methodology. As Eskridge has noted, textualism
“lacks a satisfactory theory of precedent” 209; in this sense, the doctrine seems descriptively
incomplete. Chakrabarty was thus much more a dynamic than a textualist decision, and the
Court took an active role in fostering scientific progress in the face of technology evolving too
rapidly for Congress to keep up.
On a broader level, textualism is unhelpful in resolving the central dilemma raised by
cases such as Chakrabarty. The question of whether to consider legislative history to determine
the enacting legislature’s collective “intent,” the main focus for Manning, is largely irrelevant in
Chakrabarty, because there is no enacting legislative “intent” that could possibly be elucidated in
that case. The enacting Congresses in 1793 and 1952 could not have foreseen or understood the
issues raised in Chakrabarty, and trying to uncover their views on patenting of living organisms
would therefore be pointless. The real question in the Chakrabarty context is how to proceed
when social circumstances have changed so drastically since the enactment of a statute that both
the actual text of a statute and extra-textual indicators as to Congress’ intentions are close to
useless in deciding a contemporary controversy. As to this problem, Manning’s theory is not
helpful.
3.3.2: Elhauge and Preference-Estimating
Professor Einer Elhauge points out this problem with the textualist approach in his article,
Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules [hereinafter “Preference-Estimating”].210 Elhauge
argues that statutory interpretation involves two distinct concerns: (1) “How should courts divine
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a statute’s meaning?”, and (2) “How should courts decide what to do when they cannot divine a
statute’s meaning?”211 The first problem is the focus of textualism and several other theories of
statutory interpretation, while the second problem has been largely neglected within academia,
Elhauge argues. It is this second problem that makes the Chakrabarty case difficult.
While Elhauge, like Eskridge, rejects the basic premises of textualism, he disagrees in
important ways with Eskridge’s model, and suggests a third alternative for statutory
interpretation. In Preference-Estimating, Elhauge suggests that where statutory ambiguity and
changed circumstances leave a statute’s meaning as to a particular issue unclear, judges should
not resort to policy judgments but should instead act as “honest agents for the political
branches.”212 While this might seem difficult in the absence of any evidence of the enacting
legislature’s actual intentions, Elhauge suggests that it can be achieved through the use of
“preference-estimating default rules” in statutory interpretation – rules that would generally
minimize political dissatisfaction with the interpretive result.213 Elhauge’s suggestion for a
central default rule places his approach squarely between the theories of Eskridge and Manning:
I conclude that where there is ambiguity in statutory meaning, the enacting
government's preferences would overall be maximized by a general default rule
that dynamically tracks the enactable preferences of the current government –
where those preferences can be determined with relative reliability – rather than
statically sticking with the enacting government's preferences.214
Elhauge suggests that although his model focuses on the preferences of the current legislature, it
is in fact faithful to the preferences of the enacting legislature. The enacting legislature, he
argues, would prefer to have power over all existing statutes during its time in office, including
those enacted by previous legislatures, rather than having power only over those statutes it
actually enacted, even if such power were to extend into the distant future.215
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Elhauge is careful to distinguish his theory from theories such as Eskridge’s, which
encourage judges to update old statutes along with changing values and preferences in society at
large. In Elhauge’s view, a judge may update a statute through statutory interpretation only
where the change could actually be enacted into law by the current legislature, taking into
account all of the political and procedural barriers involved in such an enterprise.216 Imposing
such a limitation on dynamic statutory interpretation by a court, Elhauge argues, allows judges to
act as agents “for the political forces that can command enough political agreement to enact
statutes,” while not allowing judges to “take sides where political gridlock exists.”217 Such a
system is helpful to the legislature, Elhauge suggests, in those situations where an enactable
preference might not become law due to the simple costs of legislating, or might take more time
to be enacted than the legislature would prefer:
[T]he whole point of using preference-estimating default rules is to minimize
political dissatisfaction for issues too minor to provoke legislative action, or in the
interim before the legislature acts, and to free the political process from the
needless burden of making enactments it would probably make if time and
political energy were not scarce.218
For a preference to be considered currently enactable so as to justify dynamic statutory
interpretation by a court, it must be “memorialized in some relatively well-defined official
political action, Elhauge states.”219 He suggests that where the current legislature amends or
enacts a statute without altering an interpretation of a statute that has been brought to its
attention, there is a good chance that the interpretation is enactable.220 He also argues that
subsequent legislative history may in some cases provide a good indication that a preference is
currently enactable.221
Under Elhauge’s paradigm, the Court’s holding in Chakrabarty was incorrect. Since
§101 was ambiguous as to the permissibility of patenting of living organisms and the social
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context had changed greatly since enactment of the statute, Elhauge would focus on whether a
law allowing patenting of living organisms would be currently enactable by the legislature. The
answer in this case is almost certain: Congress in 1980 could not have enacted such a law. This is
aptly demonstrated by the astonished reaction of both the press and the legislature to the Court’s
holding, as discussed above. This fact wouldprobably have been clear to the Court at the time as
well, based on the controversy that surrounded genetic engineering. Certainly, Elhauge’s
requirement that the preference for allowing organism patenting be “memorialized in some
relatively well-defined official political action” was not satisfied.
It is important to distinguish Elhauge’s view from Eskridge’s – while Elhauge argues
against dynamic statutory interpretation unless a political preference is actually enactable by the
current legislature, Eskridge suggests that dynamic statutory interpretation is generally
permissible at least as to political preferences that will not be overridden by the legislature.222
This division is critical, since dynamic statutory interpretation by the Court is likely to have the
most significant effect precisely in those holdings permitted by Eskridge but forbidden by
Elhauge – where the issue is not quite controversial enough for the legislature to reverse the
court, but not politically harmless enough for the legislature itself to enact the preference into
law, at least at the present time. Chakrabarty falls within this category.
I suggest that, in cases with implications for scientific and technological progress,
Eskridge’s more permissive approach is the superior one. Such science and technology-related
cases are generally characterized by important time constraints – a court’s decision to update a
statute ten years before the legislature would have achieved the change (this was arguably the
situation in Chakrabarty) can critically impact the pace of scientific innovation. In this context,
Elhauge’s requirement that the court wait until the change could be enacted by the legislature

42

itself is inadequate, leaving the court almost as passive as a textualist approach would. A few
months might be saved under this model, but likely little more. Elhauge’s model does not take
advantage of the particular trait that makes courts such valuable partners to the legislature: the
ability to make change quickly.
Both Eskridge and Elhauge present their theories as empirically correct and normatively
preferable – both claim that the Court does and should act in the way they describe. I take no
position as to the empirical question, but suggest that at least in the scientific arena, the Court
should behave as Eskridge suggests.223
Elhauge’s objections to endorsing dynamic statutoryinterpretation wherever
congressional override is unlikely are significant. He argues that although some judicial
judgment is always required in the realm of statutory interpretation, allowing judges to judicially
impose unenactable preferences undermines the country’s democratic institutions.224 Elhauge
suggests that this type of statutory interpretation might in fact be constitutionally problematic,
since it would permit the development of law outside the bounds of bicameralism and
presentment.225
Elhauge himself admits,226 however, thatdeciding which political preferences are
actually enactable is itself a difficult and imprecise enterprise, allowing room for judges to draw
the fine lines and consider the policy issues that Elhauge would like them to ignore. Assuming,
then, that judicial discretion is ultimately unavoidable, the complete legislative supremacy
championed by Elhauge seems an impracticable goal, not significantly more likely to occur
under his approach than under Eskridge’s. Elhauge’s approach would undeniably lead to some
higher degree of fealty to legislative preferences than Eskridge’s, but I suggest that because of
the significant judicial discretion inherent in both models, the difference would be marginal and
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too insignificant to sacrifice the valuable efficiency goals promoted by Eskridge’s approach, at
least where time-sensitive scientific innovation is involved. Eskridge’s strategy would
sufficiently guarantee legislative supremacy and would set a more optimal balance between
society’s interests in preventing judicial policy-making and its interests in keeping the law up to
date with technological progress.
3.4: The Ability of Congress to Respond to Supreme CourtStatutory Holdings
Of course, the view delineated above depends for its power on the proposition that
Congress is generally vigilant in reviewing judicial interpretations of its statutes, at least by the
Supreme Court. If Congress does not generally pay attention to Supreme Court interpretations
and override those with which it disagrees, Eskridge’s theory would allow the Court to impose
its own legal preferences on society with no restriction, in which case Elhauge’s method presents
a better way to protect democratic institutions. As discussed in the next section, Professor
Eskridge has contributed greatly to elucidating this important issue.
In Overriding, Eskridge argues that despite conventional wisdom suggesting that
Congress is ignorant of Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes, Congress and
congressional committees are actually “aware of the Court’s statutory decisions, devote
significant efforts towards analyzing their policy implications, and override those decisions with
a frequency heretofore unreported.”227
To test his theory, Eskridge performed a thorough empirical study on Supreme Court
federal statutory decisions overridden, or at least considered and discussed, byCongress between
1967 and 1991.228 Eskridge found that Congress considers and deliberates over a large
proportion of Supreme Court statutory decisions, and overrides a small though not insignificant
number of these: between 1975 and 1990, for example, each Congress overrode an average of
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approximately twelve Supreme Court statutory decisions, and almost half of the Court’s statutory
decisions per year since 1975 had been or were soon to be the focus of congressional hearings in
1991, at the time Eskridge published the article.229 Based on this data, Eskridge concludes that
“the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions are accessible to Congress,” and that “key staff
members become aware of any significant Supreme Court decision affecting issues within their
committee’s jurisdiction.”230 Eskridge also notes that when Congress decides to override a Court
decision, it usually does so quickly – of the Supreme Court cases that were overridden, almost
half were overridden within two years of the decision, two-thirds within five years, and three
quarters within ten years.231
Eskridge also considered the nature of Supreme Court statutory decisions thatwere most
and least likely to be overridden by Congress. He found that cases dealing with criminal law,
antitrust, civil rights, and bankruptcy were overridden at the highest rates.232 Patent law cases
(grouped together with copyright and trademark cases) were overridden at an intermediate rate as
compared to other types of cases.233 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Eskridge found that the more
fragmented or ideologically divided the Court had been in its holding, the more likely Congress
was to overturn the decision: most of the holdings overridden by Congress were decided by a 44, 5-4, or 6-3 Court, and three-fifths were ideologically divided in some way, usually with
Justices Brennan and Marshall on one side and Justice Rehnquist on the other.234 (It is interesting
to note that although Chakrabarty was a 5-4 decision, it did not divide neatly along traditional
ideological lines – conservative justices Burger and Rehnquist were in the majority with Justices
Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, and liberal justices Marshall and Brennan were joined by more
centrist justices White and Powell.)
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Eskridge also considered who the “losing” groups were in the court cases that were most
likely to be overridden by Congress. His findings indicate that federal, state, and local
governments are significantly more likely to convince Congress to override an adverse Supreme
Court decision than any other group, while religious groups, the poor, veterans, non-citizens,
racial minorities, criminal defendants, the disabled, and women are among the groups least likely
to achieve a congressional override.235
Congress is generally unable or unwilling to pass legislation where powerful interest
groups are aligned on both sides of an issue. In the twenty-four years between 1967 and 1991,
Eskridge says, there were “only a handful of overrides in which Congress acted against the
strong opposition of an important interest group, and the overrides in those cases required a
Herculean effort.”236 Eskridge notes an interesting corollary to this phenomenon: in the arena of
Supreme Court statutory interpretation, the most controversial instances of judicial policymaking
are generally least likely to be overridden by Congress, because in such cases there are generally
“strong interest group alignments on both sides of the issues, leaving the Court's decisions firmly
intact.”237 For this reason, he observes, “the Court’s most dramatic policymaking decisions have
remained untouched by Congress.”238
Eskridge notes that such a phenomenon, if responsible for the relatively small numberof
congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations, would be troubling, as it
would confirm the fear that the judiciary is writing its policy preferences permanently into
law.239 He suggests, however, that the real explanation for this scarcity of congressional
overrides may be that, as discussed above, the Court tends to interpret statutes as it believes the
current Congress would interpret them, so as to intentionally avoid a congressional override.240
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Thus, Eskridge’s data generally support the view that Congress is vigilant in reviewing
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes. His findings as to the power of interest groups
are significant, however, and suggest that in updating old statutes while avoiding Congressional
overrides, the Court should be cognizant of those cases in which interest group gridlock leaves
Congress unable rather than unwilling to override a Court decision. This context provide a
particularly strong argument for Elhauge, since a Court willing to act in the absence of
Congressional override in such cases would likely subvert the intentions of Congress, while a
Court willing to create changes only if they could be enacted by the current legislature would
not. The Court should thus avoid aggressive interpretation in such cases.241 With this caveat,
however, Eskridge’s findings suggest that the model described above would not be characterized
by judicial policymaking run amok, but would instead usefully balance majoritarian interests and
efficient development of the law.
On the other hand, legislative inaction (the only signal that would be available under the
approach described above) is generally considered an unreliable indicator of legislative
preferences, as Eskridge himself has noted. In his 1988 article, Interpreting Legislative Inaction,
Eskridge discusses whether courts interpreting statutes should consider Congress’ failure to
overrule a particular judicial interpretation as indicating that Congress approves of the
interpretation. Eskridge states explicitly, “I believe that legislative inaction usually tells us very
little about actual legislative intent,” and notes the many complexities of the legislative process
that make interpretation of legislative inaction an often fruitless enterprise.242 First, Eskridge
says, “it is very hard to aggregate preferences in such a large collection of people.”243 Second,
because of the limited legislative agenda in Congress, “it is far more likely that something will
not happen (inaction) than that it will (action),” due largely to inertia.244 Even where a bill has
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substantial support, Eskridge notes, severe procedural roadblocks may be erected by opponents
of the legislation.245
Again, these difficulties in interpreting legislative inaction argue in favor of Elhauge’s
model, since under that approach, only affirmative action by Congress can provide a sufficient
signal to permit dynamic statutory interpretation by the Court. But despite the problems with
interpreting legislative action, I suggest that the general vigilance of Congress in reviewing
Supreme Court interpretations provides a sufficient safeguard that legislative preferences will not
be thwarted under the model I describe. Although Elhauge’s view provides some additional
safeguard against judicial policymaking, the difference is not great, both because Congress
generally does respond to Court opinions with which it strongly disagrees, as Eskridge
demonstrates, and because either theory would provide significant room for judicial discretion.
The critical importance of efficient advancement of the law in relation to scientific knowledge
ultimately weighs in favor of Eskridge’s approach, at least in the technological arena. The
Chakrabarty case itself provides an excellent example of the Supreme Court’s ability to
dynamically advance the law while showing sufficient respect to majoritarian demands.
3.5: The Congressional Response to Chakrabarty
At least two clear stages characterized the congressional reaction to Chakrabarty – the
initial lack of response between 1980 and 1987, and the later debates in the House and Senate
following the Board’s decision in Ex Parte Allen in 1987. These stages are considered separately
below.
3.4.1: 1980 to 1987: No Word from Congress
The lack of interest in the Chakrabarty decision evinced by Congress between 1980 and
1987 is quite significant in light of Eskridge’s findings. In the period between the 96th and 100th
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Congresses (1979-1988), Congress scrutinized a total of 262 Supreme Court statutory decisions,
and overrode 62 such decisions.246 Eskridge did not calculate a precise ratio of scrutinized to
unscrutinized Supreme Court decisions during this period, but he did find, for example, that
between the 1977 and 1983 Supreme Court terms, the House and Senate Judiciary Committee s
scrutinized an average of 39 percent of all the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases that
were within their jurisdiction.247 Congress’ complete lack of response to Chakrabarty thus
suggests that it “approved of,” or at least did not disagree with, the holding – thatthe Court in at
least some sense enacted the legislature’s preferences into law.
The objection that congressional inaction is difficult to interpret does not appear
particularly significant in relation to the 1980-87 congressional reaction to Chakrabarty. The fact
that Congress actively considered Chakrabarty after the 1987 Allen decision suggests that such
an investigation could have occurred immediately following the holding had their been sufficient
interest, and that Congress’ silence at the time indicated some level of acquiescence to the
decision, rather than a procedural or interest-group-created roadblock. In addition, Eskridge’s
description of how legislation can fall through procedural cracks seems to apply more strongly to
cases in which the legislature considers an issue and then fails to follow through, as Congress did
after 1987 – in that case, the procedural or political reasons for the failure could be manifold.
Where Congress shows absolutely no interest in an issue, however, these explanations seem
implausible, particularly in light of Eskridge’s convincing evidence that Congress regularly
deliberated upon large numbers of Supreme Court decisions during the period of the
Chakrabarty decision.
It is notable that while a long congressional silence followed the Chakrabarty decision,
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Congress began to deliberate over the holding almost immediately following the In re Allen
decision, which interpreted Chakrabarty to permit animal patenting. Perhaps this pattern
indicates that Congress originally believed Chakrabarty did not apply to animals, and was
unconcerned by the holding for that reason. Under this understanding, Congress’ original
passivity in the face of the Chakrabarty decision was due to a simple misunderstanding of the
holding’s significance, and thus sheds little light on whether the decision was in any sense
consistent with legislative preferences. To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the
legislative activity that followed the Allen decision, when the expansiveness of the Chakrabarty
holding had become quite clear.
3.4.2: 1987 to the Present: AString of Failed Proposals
The significance of the multitude of failed congressional bills that followed Ex Parte
Allen is difficult to determine, in part because of the problems with interpreting legislative
inaction described above – many factors, including inertia and the high volume of material
considered by Congress, may have lead to the failure of the bills. Several points are, however,
notable.
First, the Court’s suggestion in Chakrabarty that the policy issues involved in the case
should be considered by Congress rather than the Court, through the process of “balancing of
competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected
representatives,”248 was arguably realized in the form of Representative Kastenmeier’s 1987
hearings in the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology. As described
above, those hearings included statements by representatives of nearly every group with a stake
in the issue, and the legal, ethical, scientific, political, and economic implications of the decision
were all considered by the committee. In this sense, the Court appropriately relied on Congress
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to consider the policy issues in Chakrabarty. This is not an insignificant point. As Eskridge
points out, congressional committees play a crucial role in gathering information, deliberating,
and making recommendations to the larger legislative body.249 Most critically, Eskridge says,
congressional committees “serve as devices to screen out the vast majority of policy proposals
submitted to Congress.”250 Thus, where a congressional committee considers in depth a policy
concern explicitly referred to it by the courts, it could be argued that a crucial step in the
democratic process is functioning properly.
Of course, such a process would not alleviate the countermajoritarian concerns related to
aggressive Supreme Court statutory interpretations in certain cases. As Eskridge notes, on certain
issues that are particularly controversial or on which powerfulinterest groups are evenly divided,
Congress may be unable to act, leaving the Court’s interpretation intact due to political
complications rather than actual legislative approval.251 Is Chakrabarty such a case? It is clear
that certain interest groups were heavily involved in the issue. Nine organizations filed amicus
briefs in Chakrabarty.252 Congressmen debating the issue on the House and Senate floors
referred to lobbying activity several times, most significantly from biotechnology companies
arguing against modification of the Chakrabarty holding (Senator Hatfield accused some biotech
companies of “highly questionable tactics”253), but also from animal rights groups, farming
groups, and others in favor of reform.254 Ananda Chakrabarty himself remembers that
Chakrabarty “was greeted with joy and a sense of relief by the biotech industry and academic
researchers [but] was viewed with disdain and frustration by many public interest and religious
groups.”255 The issue has become even more polarized today, due to the added controversy over
human cloning. There is thus certainly a possibility that congressional inaction on the issue has
been due to an interest group-created impasse.
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On the other hand, the presence of interest groups should not in itself imply that Congress
was forced into an impasse on Chakrabarty. The evidence indicates that the interest group
pressure on Congress as to Chakrabarty was not evenly divided (at least perhaps until the most
recent cloning developments). Only two of the nine amicus curiae in the case argued in favor of
the government,256 and the discussion of interest group pressure in Congress points to forceful
lobbying by biotech companies in favor of the decision, but not to significant pressure from antiChakrabarty groups. While the losing party in the case was formally the federal government
(which, according to Eskridge, generally has significant success in persuading Congress to
override a Supreme Court decision), there is no evidence that the federal government lobbied
against the decision in Congress, and the real losing parties in the case were likely those
presenting normative challenges to the decision, who probably did not have major lobbying
capabilities.257 Thus, it seems unlikely, based on Eskridge’s data, that Congress’ inaction on
Chakrabarty was due to an interest group impasse.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is almost impossible to definitively determine whether the Court’s decision
in Chakrabarty was consistent with congressional preferences or not. When the legislature does
not override the Court’s statutory interpretation, is it because the Court correctly gauged
legislative preferences, or because those preferences were stymied in the legislature? It is often
impossible to tell. But under the model described above – under which the Court interprets
statutes dynamically, but is limited by an intention of avoiding Congressional override – no such
determination is necessary. It is precisely this lesser need for legislative authorization that
distinguishes Eskridge’s from Elhauge’s approach – while Elhauge demands written evidence
that Congress itself would be willing to enact the Court’s interpretation into law, Eskridge is
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satisfied with the guarantee that Congress will override an interpretation to which it is
sufficiently opposed. Eskridge’s Court is a much more aggressive player in the “sequential
game,” acting as an active partner to Congress.
Had the Supreme Court decided Chakrabarty differently, would Congress have amended
§ 101 to allow the patenting of living organisms? Congress’ inaction in the face of Chakrabarty
suggests that it would have. Mr. Chakrabarty himself believes that Congress would have allowed
patenting of living organisms, but not immediately: “Congress is not known to take quick action
on anything that’s controversial …. Thus my hunch is that Congress would have taken 10 years
to pass legislation on the patentability of life forms and only under intense pressure from the
biotech lobby.”
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If Chakrabarty is correct that Congress would have waited 10 years before permitting
animal patenting, the Chakrabarty holding likely had critical importance in keeping up the pace
of advancements in genetic engineering in the United States. As the current debate on human
cloning and patentability in Congress demonstrates, the impact of the Chakrabarty holding
continues to be extraordinarily broad 25 years after the decision. Chakrabarty opened the door to
innovations such as the Harvard mouse and other transgenic animals like it, which have provided
extraordinary insight into human disease. The decision has also encouraged production of the
many varieties of patented transgenic plants that are pest-resistant, nutrient-rich, and might
someday ameliorate malnutrition in third-world countries.
Of course, it is impossible to know precisely what Congress would have done in the
absence of Chakrabarty – this is the dilemma with which Eskridge’s approach leaves us . But in
the area of patent law, where the rapid pace of technological progress suggests both that
Congress cannot amend statutes at a sufficiently fast rate and that legal delays can cause severe
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consequences to scientific progress, this is a cost that brings with it many benefits. There is no
sign that the pace of scientific innovation is slowing, and the Court can and should have the same
impact on other areas of technology that it has had on the progress of genetic engineering.259
Congress is an inherently slow institution, and as science and technology evolve at an
increasingly rapid rate and patent law continues to play a central role in encouraging further
innovation, the Court must be empowered to update patent doctrine through the aggressive
interpretation of statutes.
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